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An Analysis of Economic Cost Minimization and Biological
Invasion Damage Control Using the AWQ Criterion
Abstract
DeAngelo et al. (2006) have recently used the AWS criterion in a M/G/1 queuing model to
show that there is no necessary tension between economic cost minimization and inspection
stringency in non-native species management. In this paper, we use an alternate cost criterion ( AWQ
criterion) to investigate the generality of this central result in DeAngelo et al. (2006). Our theoretical
analysis shows that there is no unambiguous answer to this question. Therefore, we use numerical
methods and our numerical analysis leads to two findings. First, for many values of the model
parameters that describe the strictness of inspections, there is a tension between cost minimization
and inspection stringency. Second, for most values of the model parameter that depicts the volume
of maritime trade handled by the seaport under consideration, there is no tension between cost
minimization and inspection stringency.
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1. Introduction
In modern times, airplanes, ships, and trucks have all been used to carry goods from one
region of the world to another. Representative textbooks in international trade such as Feenstra
(2004) and Krugman and Obstfeld (2005) tell us that unrestricted trade between different regions of
the world is welfare improving. This notwithstanding, researchers in both the life and the social
sciences have increasingly pointed out that the extent of these welfare improvements is likely to be
less than what most investigators have hitherto posited. Why? As Parker et al. (1999), Batabyal
(2004), and Work et al. (2005) have noted, this is because in addition to carrying goods between
regions, airplanes, ships, and trucks have also managed to carry a whole host of non-native plant and
animal species (also known as alien or invasive species) from one geographical region of the world
to another.
There are many ways in which airplanes, ships, and trucks have transported non-native plant
and animal species from one region of the world to another. Non-native animal species have
sometimes succeeded in lodging themselves in the landing gear of airplanes and in this way they have
traveled as stowaways from one nation to another. Similarly, a number of marine non-native species
have been introduced unintentionally into a region by ships dumping their ballast water. Cargo ships
commonly carry ballast water in order to augment vessel stability when they are not carrying full
loads. When these ships come into a seaport, this ballast water must be released before cargo can be
loaded. This means of species introductions is important and very recently the problem of managing
alien species that have been introduced into a particular region by means of the dumping of ballast
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water has received some attention in the literature.5
Ships routinely use containers to carry cargo from one nation to another and these containers
are often the source for the introduction of one or more non-native species. Such introductions take
place because non-native species can remain hidden in containers for long periods of time. In addition,
substances such as wood—often used to pack cargo in containers—may themselves contain nonnative species. In fact, as noted by Batabyal and Nijkamp (2005), a joint report from the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), and
the United States Forest Service (USFS) has shown that nearly 51.8% of maritime shipments contain
solid wood packing substances and that infection rates for solid wood packing substances are nontrivial (USDA, APHIS, and USFS (2000, p. 25)). To see this, consider the following case.
Inspections of wooden spools from China revealed infection rates between 22% and 24% and
inspections of braces for granite blocks imported into Canada were found to hold live insects 32%
of the time (USDA, APHIS, and USFS (2000, pp. 27-28)).
When non-native species invade new habitats, they give rise to immense costs in the nations
in which these novel habitats are located. Here are two illustrations of such costs from the United
States. First, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA (1993)) has established that the Russian
wheat aphid caused $600 million worth of crop damage between 1987 and 1989. Second, Pimentel
et al. (2000) have calculated the total costs of all non-native species at around $137 billion per year.
Economic costs are not the end of the story. In fact, in addition to these economic costs, non-native
species have caused a lot of ecological damage as well. For example, Vitousek et al. (1996) have
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noted that non-native species can change ecosystem processes, act as vectors of diseases, and
diminish biological diversity. In addition, Cox (1993) has observed that out of 256 vertebrate
extinctions with a known cause, 109 are the outcome of the actions of non-native species. Because
of these reasons, both economists and ecologists are very interested in the management of non-native
species.
Now, from the standpoint of a manager, there are a number of actions that this individual can
take to address the problem of biological invasions. These actions are typically pre-invasion or postinvasion in nature. The objective of pre-invasion actions is to prevent non-native species from
invading a new habitat. In contrast, post-invasion actions involve the optimal control of a non-native
species, given that this species has already invaded a new habitat. The nascent economics literature
on the management of non-native species has generally focused its attention on the properties of
alternate post-invasion actions. For instance, Barbier (2001) has noted that the economic impact of
a biological invasion can be discerned by analyzing the nature of the interaction between the native
and the alien species. Using an intertemporal management model Eiswerth and Johnson (2002) point
out that the optimal level of management effort is responsive to ecological factors that are not only
species and site specific but also probabilistic in nature. Olson and Roy (2002) have used a stochastic
framework to examine the situations in which it is optimal to wipe out a non-native species and the
situations in which it is not optimal to do so. Finally, Eiswerth and van Kooten (2002) have shown
that in some cases, it is possible to use information furnished by specialists to create a model in which
it is optimal to not eradicate but instead regulate the spread of an alien species.
Inspections are a basic pre-invasion tool that is available to managers interested in precluding
biological invasions. They are routinely used at airports, land border crossings, and in seaports to
5

screen humans, the cargo carried by humans, and the cargo carried in containers. As a result, several
researchers have now begun to formally study inspections and their properties in the context of nonnative species management. In this regard, McAusland and Costello (2004), Batabyal et al. (2005),
Batabyal and Beladi (2006), and DeAngelo et al. (2006) have all studied the properties of alternate
ways of structuring the inspection function given that inspections are a very useful practical preinvasion management tool. McAusland and Costello (2004) show that when one takes a dynamic
view and considers the future effects of current species introductions, one is naturally led to favor
more stringent inspections. Batabyal and Beladi (2006) use queuing theory to show how
maximization problems for choosing the optimal number of inspectors can be formulated after one
undertakes a stationary state analysis of two multi-person inspection regimes. Batabyal et al. (2005)
have analyzed M/M/1 and M/M/2 queuing models of inspections and have concluded that there is
a tension between economic cost minimization and inspection stringency in non-native species
management. What this means is that greater inspection stringency with a larger number of inspectors
leads to higher economic costs and laxer inspection stringency with a smaller number of inspectors
results in lower economic costs.
The paper that is most closely related to our paper is the one by DeAngelo et al. (2006).
Focusing their attention on an arbitrary seaport, these researchers have studied the properties of
inspections by utilizing the “average wait of a ship in the port system” or AWS criterion in a M/G/1
queuing model. Their basic result is that there is no necessary tension between economic cost
minimization and inspection stringency in non-native species management. In the context of their
paper, greater (lesser) inspection stringency reflects an enhanced (decreased) concern for the potential
damage from a biological invasion. Therefore, a seaport manager who places a relatively big (small)
6

weight on invasion damage control will, all else being equal, want to inspect ships more (less)
stringently.
As we have noted previously, inspections clearly constitute an important part of the general
task of pre-invasion non-native species management. Therefore, we use an alternate cost criterion,
namely the “average wait of a ship in queue” or AWQ criterion to investigate the generality of the
central “no necessary tension” result in DeAngelo et al. (2006). Note that we’re not saying that AWS
is a useless measure of costs. On the contrary, it is a perfectly reasonable way to model the economic
cost of inspections. Further, we stress that within the context of a queuing model of non-native
species management, there are two standard ways of modeling the economic cost imposed on society
by inspections.6 DeAngelo et al. (2006) have used AWS and have hence concentrated on the first of
these two ways. Therefore, a natural question to ask is whether the central DeAngelo et al. (2006)
result holds when costs are modeled using the second of these two ways. That is what we’re doing
in this paper by focusing on AWQ and this is the sense in which our paper is an extension of the
earlier DeAngelo et al. (2006) paper.
Our theoretical analysis demonstrates that there is an ambiguous answer to this tension
question. Hence, we use numerical methods and our numerical analysis leads to two conclusions.
First, for many values of the model parameters that describe the strictness of inspections, there is a
tension between cost minimization and inspection stringency. Second, for most values of the model
parameter that depicts the volume of maritime trade handled by the seaport under consideration, there
is no tension between cost minimization and inspection stringency. Our results in this paper are
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different from the findings in Batabyal et al. (2005) with the M/M/1 and the M/M/2 queuing models.
The general reason for this variance is that the queuing model that we employ in this paper is different
from the queuing models used by Batabyal et al. (2005). More specifically, the random inspection
times in the Batabyal et al. (2005) paper are exponentially distributed and the exponential distribution
is the unique distribution that has the so called memoryless property.7 In contrast, in the present
paper, the inspection times are generally and not exponentially distributed.
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 provides a primer on queuing theory
and then this section describes the queuing theoretic model that we use in this paper. Section 3 first
delineates the “average wait of a ship in queue” or AWQ criterion that we use in this paper to explore
the generality of the findings obtained by DeAngelo et al. (2006). Next, this third section conducts a
detailed theoretical and numerical analysis of the aforementioned tension question. Section 4 concludes
and offers suggestions for future research on the subject of this paper.
2. Economic Cost Minimization and Inspection Stringency
2.1. Queuing theory: a primer
Queuing theory—see Taylor and Karlin (1998) and Ross (2003) for textbook
expositions—studies waiting lines or queues from a mathematical perspective. All queuing models
have the following three features. First, there is a random arrival process. Second, there is a
probabilistic service process. Finally, there is a deterministic number of servers. In the queuing model
of this paper, the Poisson process constitutes the arrival process. In this case, the times between
successive arrivals are exponentially distributed and the exponential distribution is memoryless.

7

For additional details on this property see Ross (2003, pp. 272-273).

8

Therefore, the letter M is commonly used to describe the Poisson arrival process.8
Like the interarrival times of the previous paragraph, in general, the service or inspection times
are also stochastic. The reader will recall that the main aim of our paper is to investigate the generality
of the findings in DeAngelo et al. (2006). Therefore, like DeAngelo et al. (2006), we also use the
letter G to denote the general cumulative distribution function of the random inspection times.9
Finally, the deterministic number of inspectors is generally denoted by some positive integer and in our
paper we suppose that this positive integer is one. In the language of queuing theory, the inspection
regime that we’re analyzing in this paper corresponds to the M/G/1 queuing model. In words, in our
model, the arrival process of ships in the seaport is Poisson, the time it takes to inspect a ship is
arbitrarily or generally distributed, and there is one representative inspector.
2.2. Inspections in alien species management
Consider a stylized seaport in a specific coastal region of some nation that is publically owned.
Ships with ballast water and/or cargo in containers arrive at this seaport to either load or unload cargo.
If they have arrived to load cargo then these ships carry this cargo to a seaport in some other region
of the world. The arrival of these ships coincides with the arrival of a whole host of possibly damaging
non-native animal and plant species. We suppose that the arrival rate of these animal and plant species
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Note that when we say that the random inspection time is arbitrarily distributed, this does not mean that there are absolutely no
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is proportional to the arrival rate of the ships and hence we shall not model these species directly.
Instead, we shall concentrate on the ships that bring these species to our seaport by means of either
their ballast water or the containers that are used to carry the cargo. The arrival process of the ships
in our seaport denotes the arrival process for the queuing theoretic inspection regimes that we analyze
in this paper.
Following the discussion in section 2.1, we assume that the ships in question arrive at our
seaport in conformity with a Poisson process with rate λ>0. The reader should note that, ceteris
paribus, a higher λ indicates two things. First, because the arrival rate of the various non-native animal
and plant species is proportional to the arrival rate of the ships, a higher λ means a larger volume of
possibly deleterious biological organisms and hence a higher chance of a biological invasion. Second,
a higher λ also means that our seaport is now dealing with more cargo or a higher volume of maritime
trade. This discussion tells us that λ serves as a proxy for both the likelihood of a biological invasion
and the volume of maritime trade.
A key objective of our seaport manager is to prevent invasions by the potentially destructive
animal and plant species entering the seaport under study. Hence, arriving ships must be inspected
before they can either load or unload cargo. We suppose that ships are inspected on a first-come-firstserved basis and one inspector is assigned to each dock in our seaport. In what follows, we shall
analyze a representative dock inspector’s decision problem. Also, we shall think of the inspection
function broadly. What this means is that for some ships, only the ballast water will be inspected. For
other ships, only the containers carrying cargo will require inspection. Finally, for a third group of
ships, both the ballast water and the containers will be inspected. Therefore, inspections will generally
require random amounts of time. To model this explicitly, we allow the inspection times to be
10

arbitrarily distributed. The seaport system under study consists of ships that are being inspected, ships
that are waiting to be inspected, the representative dock inspector, and the seaport manager.
It is reasonable to expect that the amount of time it takes to complete inspections has a direct
bearing on the stringency of inspections. Hence, to model this idea, we assume that there are two
feasible inspection regimes in our seaport. In the first or more stringent inspection regime, the average
2

inspection time is νM and the variance of this time is τM. In the second or less stringent inspection
2

regime, the mean inspection time is νL and the variance of this time is τL. Further, we assume that
2

2

νM>νL and that τM<τL. These two inequalities together tell us that inspection regime M is more

stringent than inspection regime L. Why? Because relative to regime L, on average, regime M
requires that more time be spent on the inspection function. Also, the variability of the time spent
inspecting ships in regime M is less than the variability of the time spent inspecting ships in regime L.
As a consequence, the more stringent M regime’s inspection times have a smaller coefficient of
variation and thus are consistently smaller compared to those of the less stringent L regime.
The reader should note that we are measuring the reliability of the two inspection regimes with
2

2

the two variance parameters τM and τL. In other words, the stringent regime is stringent not only
because on average the inspector spends more time inspecting ships but also because, having spent
more time, the inspector can be more certain that he has not made either type I or type II errors while
discharging his duties. This feeling “more certain” corresponds to greater reliability and this greater
2

2

reliability, in turn, corresponds to a lower variance. That is why we have τM<τL. 10 Given this
2

2

interpretation, note that the τM>τL case is intuitively and practically implausible because this case
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would mean that even though the inspector spends more time on average in the stringent regime
inspecting ships, he is still less certain about the reliability of the inspection that he has undertaken.
The basic description of our two queuing theoretic inspection regimes is now complete. The
more stringent inspection regime M corresponds to a M/G/1 queuing model with average inspection
2

time νM and variance τM and the less stringent or L inspection regime also corresponds to a M/G/1
2

queuing model but now with mean inspection time νL and variance τL. The reader should understand
the manner in which we have mathematically depicted the basic question of this paper: When seeking
to preclude a biological invasion by inspecting the ballast water and/or the containers of ships, which
inspection regime, M or L, ought our seaport manager to have in place? We now proceed to
theoretically and numerically analyze the inspection regime choice question for the AWQ cost criterion
that we identified in section 1.
3. The AWQ criterion
Inspections that lead to the preclusion of a biological invasion by non-native animal or plant
species undoubtedly result in benefits to the citizens of the coastal region that we are studying.
However, during the time that arriving ships are being inspected, there is neither loading nor unloading
of cargo, and hence, in general, economic activity resulting from maritime trade is at a standstill. This
ephemeral stoppage of economic activities imposes costs on the economy of our coastal region. This
cost can be measured by computing a specific criterion such as “the average wait of a ship in the port
system” or AWS. In this way of looking at the problem, the longer (shorter) the average wait in the
port system or AWS, the larger (smaller) the costs from the cessation of economic activities.
Therefore, a seaport manager who is concerned primarily about the economic costs that are imposed
on society by the activities of the representative inspector will want to keep AWS as low as possible.
12

In contrast, a seaport manager who frets more about the possible damage to society from a biological
invasion will want to have the more stringent or M inspection regime in place. DeAngelo et al. (2006)
have used this AWS criterion in a M/G/1 queuing model and have shown that contrary to the central
finding in Batabyal et al. (2005), there is no universal tension between economic cost minimization
and inspection stringency in non-native species management.
As noted in section 1, the AWS criterion is one of two possible criteria that we can use in
thinking about the above mentioned economic costs in the context of a queuing model. As such,
suppose we adopt a somewhat looser interpretation of these costs and say that the loading and/or the
unloading of cargo may proceed on a ship that is presently being inspected for potentially invasive
species but that such activities may not take place on ships that have yet to be inspected and are
waiting in queue. In this way of looking at the problem, ships in queue are the ones that are most likely
to impose economic costs on society. We shall refer to this second—and somewhat looser—economic
cost criterion as the “average wait of a ship in queue” or AWQ criterion. Given this alternate cost
criterion, a key issue that arises is this: Do the findings contained in DeAngelo et al. (2006) hold when
the AWQ criterion and not the AWS criterion is used to measure the economic cost of inspections?
We now address this question in detail.
Our first order of business is to compute AWQ for the two M/G/1 inspection regimes that we
are presently studying. To do this, we shall use equations 1.2 and 3.17 in Taylor and Karlin (1998, p.
544 and p. 563). Using these two equations, our desired expressions for AWQ are
AWQM'{λ(τM%νM)}/{2(1&λνM)} and AWQL'{λ(τL%νL)}/{2(1&λνL)}
2

2

2

2

(1)
2

2

respectively for the two regimes. We can use the inequalities νM>νL and τM<τL to show that
2(1&λvM)<2(1&λνL). However, because (τM%νM) may be larger or smaller than (τL%νL), simply
2

2
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2

2

2

2

knowing that νM>νL and that τM<τL does not permit us to say anything unambiguous about the relative
magnitudes of AWQM and AWQL. In other words, when our seaport manager sanctions the use of the
more stringent M inspection regime in the seaport under study, it is not always the case that economic
costs measured by the AWQ criterion will be higher. So, in the general case, there may or may not be
a tension between economic cost minimization and inspection stringency. This tells us that even when
we use the AWQ criterion, the finding in DeAngelo et al. (2006) that there is no necessary tension
between economic cost minimization and inspection stringency holds.
We have just seen that there is no unique resolution of this tension question. To provide
additional insight into this issue, in the remainder of this paper, we use a numerical perspective to
study this tension question in three different ways. However, before we move to the specifics of the
numerical analysis, let us stress three points. First, it is clearly infeasible to work with the infinitely
2

2

many combinations of the model parameters (λ,νM,νL,τM,τL) that are possible. As such, the reader
should understand that the primary point of the subsequent numerical analysis is illustrative. We wish
to demonstrate not only the functional dependence of the AWQ criterion on the various model
parameters but also the different results that obtain as we vary these parameters. Second, we have
conducted numerical analyses of the sort delineated below with many different values of the distinct
model parameters. Rather than bore the reader with umpteen graphs of the various possible results,
what we are reporting below is a selection of model parameters that generates—to the best of our
knowledge—representative results. Finally, the collective lesson from the above two points is that the
answer to the central tension question that we are investigating in this paper is seaport specific.
Different seaports are likely to have different values of the arrival rate λ. Therefore, in a particular
practical situation, a seaport manager will typically want to choose the inspection regime stringency
14

parameters (ν,τ) to account for the specific value of λ confronting him as he optimizes a particular
objective function such as AWQ. 11
Let the arrival rate of ships be λ'1 per unit time. Further, suppose that the parameters of the
two inspection regimes are (νM,τM)'(0.5,0.2) and (νL,τL)'(0.4,0.9). Now, employing equation (1), it
2

2

is straightforward to confirm that AWQM'0.45λ/(2&λ) and AWQL'1.06λ/(2&0.8λ). When λ'1, these
two expressions reduce to AWQM'0.45 and AWQL'0.88.
Examining these two expressions for AWQM (AWQL) we see that as the arrival rate of ships λ
approaches 2 (2.5), economic costs measured by the AWQM (AWQL) criterion approach infinity. This
means that there is an upper limit on the volume of maritime trade that our seaport can handle and
when this limit is approached, the economic costs of inspections become immeasurably large. Second,
2

2

when νM,νL,τM, and τL are as stated in the previous paragraph, the economic costs of inspections are
lower when the more stringent M inspection regime is in place. The reader will note that this is also
a case in which there is no tension between economic cost reduction and inspection stringency.
3.1. The tension question in terms of the volume of maritime trade
For the parameter values specified above, we now analyze the dependence of AWQ on λ.
Equating AWQM'0.45λ/(2&λ)'0.45 and AWQL'1.06λ/(2&0.8λ)'0.88 and then simplifying gives us
0.70λ2&1.22λ'0.
(

(2)

(

The two solutions to equation (2) are λ1 '1.74 and λ2 '0. Because λ must be positive, we conclude
that λ'1.74 is the only economically meaningful solution in this case. Figure 1 plots AWQ on the
Figure 1 about here

11

Clearly, AWQ is not the only possible objective function for a seaport manager. Depending on the specifics of a particular situation,
a seaport manager may want to minimize costs in addition to those that we are capturing in AWQ.
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vertical axis against the arrival rate of ships λ on the horizontal axis. Looking at figure 1 we see that
for all values of λ, 0<λ#1.74, our seaport manager will prefer to have the more stringent or M
inspection regime in place because this regime leads to lower economic costs as measured by the
AWQ criterion. Only when λ>1.74 does it make sense for the seaport manager to use the less
stringent or L inspection regime to inspect arriving ships at the seaport under study. Put differently,
when λ0(0,1.74] there is no tension between economic cost minimization and biological invasion
damage control. In contrast, there is a tension between economic cost minimization and the stringency
of inspections when λ>1.74.
3.2. The tension question in terms of the mean inspection times
We now numerically investigate the functional dependence of AWQ on the means (νM,νL) of
the two inspection regimes and in section 3.3 we shall conduct a similar exercise from the standpoint
2

2

2

2

of the two variances (τM,τL). As in our earlier numerical analysis, we have νM>νL and τM<τL. Further,
in order to conduct the subsequent numerical analysis in two dimensions, we suppose that
νM'aνL, a>1 and that τM'bτL, b0(0,1). In other words, the two means and the two variances are
2

2

assumed to be linearly related to each other and the parameters a and b are the two constants of
proportionality. From an economic standpoint, we can think of the parameter a as a measure of the
difference in the stringencies of the two inspection regimes M and L. Similarly, the parameter b can
be thought of as a measure of the difference in the variability—and hence the reliability—of the same
two inspection regimes.
Now, using the section 3 parameter values, we have λ'1,νM'aνL,νL'0.4,τM'bτL,τL'0.9 and
2

2

2

we set b equal to its midpoint, i.e., b'0.5. Note that this b'0.5 stipulation means that the more
stringent inspection regime M is twice as reliable as the less stringent regime L. Using these values
16

of the different parameters in equation (1), we get AWQM'(0.45%0.16a 2)/(2&0.8a) and
AWQL'0.8833. Setting these two values equal gives us the following quadratic equation in a
0.16a 2%0.71a&1.32'0.
(

(3)

(

The two solutions to equation (3) are a1 '1.41 and a2 '&5.83. Because we must have a>1 it follows
(

that the only economically meaningful solution to equation (3) is a1 '1.41.
Figure 2 plots the economic cost criterion AWQ on the vertical axis against alternate values
Figure 2 about here
of a on the horizontal axis. Looking at figure 2 we see that when a'1.41 our seaport manager is
indifferent between the two inspection regimes. Further, for all a<1.41 the use of the more stringent M
inspection regime results in lower economic costs as measured by the AWQ criterion. Finally, for all a>1.41
the use of the less stringent L inspection regime leads to lower economic costs. This tells us that when
a>1.41 there is a tension between economic cost minimization and biological invasion damage
control. In contrast, when a lies in the interval (1,1.41] there is no tension between economic cost
minimization and biological invasion damage control. Note that this last “no tension” result may appear
counterintuitive but it holds for some and not all values of a. In addition, this last result does depend
2

2

on our assumption that τM<τL but as we have already pointed out in section 2.2, the alternate
2

2

assumption that τM>τL is both intuitively and practically improbable.
3.3. The tension question in terms of the variances of the inspection times
2

2

Our final task is to numerically examine the functional dependence of AWQ on the variances (τM,τL)
of the M and the L inspection regimes. As in section 3.2, in order to conduct the analysis in two
dimensions, we have τM<τL, νM>νL, τM'bτL, b0(0,1), and νM'aνL, a>1. Further, using the previous
2

2

2

2

values of the pertinent parameters, we have λ'1,νL'0.4,τL'0.9, and we shall set a'2. The reader
2
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should note that setting a'2 means that relative to the less stringent inspection regime L, on average,
twice as much time is spent in the more stringent regime M. Substituting these values of the various
parameters in equation (1), we get AWQM'1.6%2.25b and AWQL'0.8833. Inspection of these two
expressions for the economic cost criterion and some reflection tell us that there is no value of b for
which our seaport manager is indifferent between the two inspection regimes being studied.
Figure 3 plots the economic cost criterion AWQ on the vertical axis against alternate values
Figure 3 about here
of b on the horizontal axis. Figure 3 tells us that AWQ is always lower when the less stringent L
regime is used to inspect arriving ships in our seaport. In other words, for all values of b which
measures the difference in the variability—and hence reliability—of the two inspection regimes, there
is a tension between economic cost minimization and inspection stringency or biological invasion
damage control.
Does the above result depend on the specific value of a that we have chosen to conduct the
numerical analysis with? The answer is yes and to see this consider what would happen if instead of
setting a'2, we set a'1.2. In this case, once again substituting the values of the various parameters
in equation (1), we get

AWQM'0.2215%0.8654b

and

AWQL'0.8833.

Now setting

AWQM'0.2215%0.8654b'0.8833'AWQL we get b'0.7647. This tells us that when we set a'1.2,
there is no tension between economic cost minimization and biological invasion damage control as
long as b0(0,0.7647]. In contrast, when b0(0.7647,1), there is a tension between these two
objectives. In terms of figure 3, what is happening is that as we reduce the value of a from a'2 to a'1.2,
the slope of the graph of AWQM declines from 2.25 to 0.8654 and the graph itself gets pulled down
vertically toward the horizontal graph of AWQL. The reader should note that this finding—that the
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result obtained in the previous two paragraphs depends on the specific value of a —is consistent with
the general illustration and demonstration of seaport specificity objectives of our numerical analysis
as stated in section 3.
Our analysis thus far leads to four conclusions. First, the theoretical analysis tells us that the
question as to whether there is or isn’t a tension between economic cost minimization and biological
invasion damage control cannot be resolved unambiguously. Second, for many possible values of the a
parameter and for all possible values of the b parameter when a'2, there is a tension between
economic cost minimization and biological invasion damage control. Third and at variance with the
second conclusion, for several values of λ or the volume of maritime trade parameter, there is no
tension between economic cost minimization and inspection stringency. Finally, by varying both a and b,
we have graphically shown the impact that alternate choices of these two parameters have on the
AWQ objective function. In addition, this variation exercise also shows that for these two parameters,
inspection stringency, defined in terms of the mean and the variance of the inspection time random
variable, lies in the interval a0(1,4) and b0(0,1). These four conclusions are consistent with the main
findings obtained by DeAngelo et al. (2006) with the AWS cost criterion and hence we note that the
basic findings of DeAngelo et al. (2006) are general in the sense that they hold not only for the AWS
cost criterion but also for the AWQ cost criterion.
For real world applications of the model of this paper, we would need to procure values for
the arrival rate of ships and the averages and the variances of particular inspection regimes. In the
United States, information about the arrival rate of ships can be procured from the administrative
offices of individual seaports such as Long Beach and, on occasion, from governmental agencies such
as the Office of Mobile Sources of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Similarly, information
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about actual inspections in the United States can be procured from documents that are periodically
produced by the Congressional Research Service and from the Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service (APHIS).
4. Conclusions
Non-native animal and plant species often succeed in invading new habitats as a result of
maritime trade in goods by means of ships. Hence, if an appropriate authority such as a seaport
manager’s goal is to prevent biological invasions, then he must inspect arriving ships for potentially
deleterious biological organisms. Given this context, we used the AWQ cost criterion in the M/G/1
queuing model to investigate the generality of the findings obtained recently by DeAngelo et al.
(2006). Our theoretical analysis showed that there is no unique answer to the question as to whether
there is or isn’t a tension between economic cost minimization and biological invasion damage control.
In addition, our numerical analysis identified particular values of the essential model parameters for
which there is a tension between economic cost minimization and biological invasion damage control.
The general outcome of our combined theoretical and numerical analysis is twofold. First, the main
findings of DeAngelo et al. (2006) are general in the sense that they hold for the AWS and for the
AWQ cost criteria. Second, whether or not there is tension between economic cost minimization and
biological invasion damage control depends greatly on the organizational details—the arrival rate of
ships and the degree of stringency of inspections—in individual seaports.
The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of directions. We now suggest one such
direction. One issue of interest concerns the analysis of situations in which because of heavy traffic in
a particular seaport, ships do not enter this seaport but go instead to some other seaport. From the
perspective of the manager of a single seaport, this heavy traffic situation can be analyzed with a
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queuing model in which “balking” is permitted. In other words, if an arriving ship finds n other ships
already in our seaport then this ship enters our seaport only with some probability pn and it goes to
some other seaport with probability 1&pn. If we assume that long queues discourage ships from
entering a seaport then we would expect pn to be a decreasing function of n. A special case of this
balking scenario is one in which a seaport has a finite capacity F so that pn'1 for n<F and pn'0 for n$F.
As in this paper, one can analyze the properties of alternate inspection regimes in a model with these
heavy traffic related features.
From the perspective of a social welfare maximizing manager, who is responsible for all
seaports in a nation, a queuing analysis of the issues studied in this paper would have to determine the
desirable inspection stringency level at a particular seaport and coordinate inspection strategies in all
the seaports in this nation. This way, differential inspection standards would not exist and if they did
exist they would not, in and of themselves, provide incentives for arriving ships to favor certain
seaports over others. If this coordination aspect of the problem is not addressed then, in any particular
nation, the risk of one or more biological invasions may actually increase despite the presence of
inspections in all national seaports. Research on maritime trade driven biological invasions that
incorporate these aspects of the problem into the analysis will provide additional insights into a
management problem that has considerable economic and ecological ramifications.
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AWQ, varying a
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AWQ, varying b
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